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The provision of owner-occupied versus rental houses is modeled as a competitive search
economy where households have private information over their expected duration. With
public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates pay lower rents and search in
thicker rental markets. With private information, rentals are under-provided to long-duration
households to discourage short-duration households from searching there. Ownership is
attractive in part because it cures the private information problem. Using a novel data set of
rental listings, we show that homeownership rates are high where rent-to-price ratios are
low but rentals are scarce and that long-duration households sort into scarce rental markets.
These patterns are consistent with the model only under private information.
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Why do some households buy their home while others rent? There is a long list of plausible frictions that may create
meaningful differences in the value of owning versus renting a home to a household. Many of the frictions that favor
renting, such as the higher transactions costs of buying and selling a house and the downpayment constraints in the
mortgage market, appear in one form or another in nearly all life cycle models with a homeownership choice.1 There is no
such consensus on the frictions that favor owning, in part because they are under-modeled and under-measured.
One oft mooted friction is that rentals are scarce in some parts of the market. Some studies that have inserted this
friction in a reduced-form manner into their models (e.g. by imposing that large houses are only supplied on the owner-
occupied market) have been otherwise successful at explaining changes in homeownership rates over the life cycle
(Chambers et al., 2009a), over time (Chambers et al., 2009b; Fisher and Gervais, 2011), and across locations (Amior and
Halket, 2014), among others.2 In these models, absent the friction, homeownership rates would be much too low; the datalsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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cco (2007), Chambers et al. (2009a,b), Cocco (2005), Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008), Fisher and Gervais
Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Li and Yao (2007), Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos
ow” to owning (Iacoviello and Pavan, 2013; Kiyotaki et al., 2011). One class of frictions that may work
and Souleles (2005). Tax wedges may encourage ownership (Diaz and Luengo-Prado, 2008; Gervais,
other reason to own. Some theories have a user cost premium of renting over owning, perhaps due to
of renters (as in Henderson and Ioannides, 1983).
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the market is also casually intuitive: in parts of the market where homeownership rates are high, rentals are indeed few in
number. This of course is tautological.
In this paper we build and examine the evidence for the ﬁrst theory of homeownership in which rental scarcity is an
equilibrium outcome rather than an input. Since owning and renting are just labels for different (perhaps many different)
contracts to provide housing services, we model the homeownership decision and the availability of rental housing as
outcomes of a contracting problem and a search problem. Houses are ex ante identical and households differ only according
to their cost of owning and their expected duration of stay in a house, which may be private information.3 Homeowners
(which may be households or landlords) post contracts for housing services which specify a (potentially type-dependent)
price for housing services as well as whether, after eventual separation, the current owner or the eventual occupant is
responsible for ﬁnding the next tenant (a “rental” or “owning” contract, respectively).
Within the housing market in this economy, households can direct their search to a speciﬁc type of contract (so that each
type of contract is its own “submarket”) and are bilaterally matched to houses within that submarket subject to the frictions
from competitive search theory (Moen, 1997; Shimer, 1996). In equilibrium, the vacancy rate associated with a particular
contract adjusts so that the expected return of posting any contract is the same.
Our main results are twofold. First, when households' expected durations in a house are unobservable, an incentive
problem in rental markets distorts market tightnesses4 compared to the public information benchmark. In the economy
where households' expected durations are public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates (long-duration
households) pay lower rental rates and search in less tight submarkets than households with high hazard rates. However,
when expected durations are private information, long-duration households search in tighter submarkets than short-
duration households, and thus spend more time on average searching for a house (per separation spell), but pay even lower
rental rates once matched. (The unique equilibrium is separating.) The intuition for the result is that in equilibrium housing
is under-provided to long-duration households so as to discourage short-duration households from searching there. In this
sense, private information causes housing scarcity in some rental submarkets.
In our economy, owning a house solves the private information problem as households internalize their separation
hazards in their optimal search problems. However, owning comes at some heterogeneous exogenous cost (a reduced-form
way to model the various more well-understood frictions in the owner-occupied market). Our second result is that
households that expect to stay in their house long enough are more likely to choose to own rather than rent. The distortions
from the incentive problem in the rental market pile-up: the deviations from the public information benchmark due to
private information are larger in markets where the long-duration households search. Meanwhile an owning contract is
always incentive compatible. If a household has a high enough expected duration, the distortions in the rental market due to
the information problem are more likely to dominate her idiosyncratic cost of owning so that she prefers to own.
In addition to providing an equilibrium theory of homeownership, our theory also explains some perhaps puzzling
stylized facts we obtain from a unique data set. We use a large, novel data set of for-rent and for-sale listings on Craigslist to
show that, within a market (such as a city), the parts of the market (i.e. “submarket”) where homeownership rates are high
are also the parts where rentals are relatively cheap. This correlation, which is consistent with ﬁndings from Verbrugge
(2008), Verbrugge and Poole (2010) and Bracke (2013) using alternative data sets and markets, is at ﬁrst counter-intuitive. If
the rent-to-price ratio is exogenous to household demand for homeownership, then one might expect homeownership rates
to be higher in submarkets where the ratio is higher, not lower.
The solution is the correct notion of scarcity. Our data show that vacant rentals in submarkets with low rent-to-price
ratios disappear from the market quickly, the submarkets where homeownership is high. In other words, households are
more likely to search for owner-occupied housing not when the relative price of an equivalent rental is high, but rather
when an equivalent rental is hard to ﬁnd. Crucially, the data allow us to measure scarcity by measuring how quickly vacant
homes are ﬁlled and not just by the equilibrium supply of rental housing in a submarket. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
data on rental vacancies where a within-market analysis of the variation in submarket rental vacancy duration is possible.
The data also show that households that have relatively long expected durations in their homes tend to live in the submarkets
where rentals are scarce. Given the costs of vacancy for landlords, long-duration households should be appealing tenants and yet
the data indicates that rental housing for them is harder to ﬁnd. Our model shows that this is consistent with a private infor-
mation problem: only then does our equilibrium yield that rentals are relatively cheap where they are scarce. Moreover this same
private information friction endogenously provides that long-duration households search in the scarce markets and also that
more of these same households prefer to own. Furthermore, in equilibrium, free entry implies that submarkets with scarce
rentals must have low rents. So rent-to-price ratios are low where homeownership rates are high, as in the data.53 There is a long literature looking at mobility and homeownership choices. Deng et al. (2003) and Gabriel and Nothaft (2001) ﬁnd considerable
variation across households and Metropolitan Statistical Areas in rental vacancy rates and durations. Boehm et al. (1991), Cameron and Tracy (1997), Haurin
and Gill (2002) and Kan (2000) all ﬁnd relationships between mobility hazards and homeownership.
4 Markets are less tight if households on average take less time to ﬁnd a house, or equivalently if landlords take longer on average to ﬁll a vacancy.
5 Variations in households' marginal rates of substitution across submarkets could also potentially explain the correlation between expected duration
and ownership rates (as in Sinai and Souleles, 2005) but only if the marginal rates of transformation between rental and owner-occupied housing varied
similarly across submarkets. In our paper, rent-to-price ratios vary even though the marginal rates of transformation are constant.
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function is quite low. This implies that the private information problem leads to a ten percent reduction in the surplus
created by rental housing for most households. The costs of owning can in turn be quite high and still many households
would be willing to own. Or additionally, in a ﬁnal extension to the model, we show that high expected duration types may
be willing to search for rental contracts with higher initial rental payments as a way of screening lower expected duration
types.
To be clear, we intend for this to be the beginning, not the end, of research which uses contracting problems in rental
markets to construct equilibria consistent with the data on homeownership rates and prices in various markets. There are
many pet theories on why so many people choose to own; each may play some role in partly explaining why ownership
occurs.
We are following a growing literature by looking at housing in a search or matching framework (e.g. Albrecht et al., 2007,
2010; Caplin and Leahy, 2011; Head et al., 2014; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Wheaton, 1990). To
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to look at both renting and owning in such a framework and the ﬁrst to look jointly at
renting and owning with adverse selection.6Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010, 2011) examine optimal mortgage design in owner-
occupied markets (contracts for loans backed by housing services). Our work looks at contracts to supply housing services
when there are search frictions and asymmetric information and thus extends the work of Guerrieri et al. (2010) to include
dynamic contracts in a competitive search equilibriumwith adverse selection.7 In our equilibrium, contracts can be dynamic
while the markets themselves are in steady-state.8 Concurrently and complementarily, Chang (2011) and Guerrieri and
Shimer (2014) examine environments where the markets can change dynamically, however all contracts are one-time
exchanges (purchases and sales of assets).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines market tightnesses and prices in rental and owner-
occupied markets using data from Craigslist. Section 3 presents the model, ﬁrst with just renting in public and then private
information and then ﬁnally the equilibrium with both owning and renting. Section 4 numerically calibrates the model and
Section 5 extends the model to fully optimal dynamic contracts. Section 6 concludes. Most proofs are in the Appendix.2. Rental markets in the data
We merge data from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census and 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) with a novel data set
constructed from rental and for-sale advertisements posted on Craistlist.org. The Craigslist data contain over 2.29 million
for-sale postings and 3.16 million for-rent postings collected from the Craigslist.org RSS feed of listings for each metropolitan
area that Craigslist covered at that time in the USA. The data were collected from postings starting on January 2, 2010 until
June 27, 2012. Every post on the feed that had a listed street address was stored. Craigslist stopped including the street
address in the RSS feed in July, 2012. In addition to the street address, our data contain an asking price or rent, an advertised
number of bedrooms, the date of the posting as well as the URL of the posting and sometimes contain additional infor-
mation such as the number of bathrooms, whether the residence is a single-family home, and some contact information for
the listing agent.9
Craigslist lists' postings in order of recency which means that searchers on Craigslist see recent postings ﬁrst when
browsing. Therefore landlords (sellers) have an incentive to re-post their advertisement in order to move it to the top of the
listings if they are still looking for perspective tenants (buyers). We will use the time between ﬁrst and last postings for a
particular home as our measure of its market tightness: on average, homes for rent or sale in a tight market should have
short times between ﬁrst and last postings. Time between postings is clearly an imperfect measure of how long the home is
actually vacant and/or vacancy costs to the landlord. We assume in this section that the average vacancy costs per vacant
spell in a particular submarket are proportional to the length time between a vacancy's ﬁrst and last posting.
In order to determine a vacancy's ﬁrst and last posting, we must ﬁrst match houses across listings. We use the following
algorithm to match houses. We separately sort both the rental and for-sale data by date. We assume that a listing is a new
listing and not a continuation of a pre-existing listing if there is not an existing listing for an earlier date at the same address
posted within 31 days of this listing and with an asking rent (price) within 15% of the pre-existing listing. Matching postings
using the date and price of the posting is necessary because unfortunately not every listing contains an apartment number
even when the home is clearly an apartment and there are several instances where multiple apartments in the same
building seem to be concurrently for rent (or sale). Merlo and Ortalo-Magn (2004) ﬁnd that listing prices forecast well6 Hubert (1995) and Miceli and Sirmans (1999) have models with renters and adverse selection in which long-term tenants have declining rent
schedules while Barker (2003) shows that if households have inelastic demand for housing, those that expect to stay longer do not usually get discounts on
their rent. Brueckner (1994) presents a model with adverse selection and evidence that banks use menus of mortgage points and interest rates to obtain
information on a household's expected mobility.
7 Delacroix and Shi (2013) and Albrecht et al. (2010) have adverse selection problems where the side posting the price has full information. Here, as in
Guerrieri et al. (2010), the side directing its search has the superior information.
8 We are therefore abstracting away from the interesting housing dynamics discussed in Head et al. (2014), Ngai and Tenreyro (2014), among others.
9 To the best of our knowledge, our data set contains all postings on Craigslist with a listed address during the time period except for listings that were
rapidly removed by Craiglist.org or the posting author.
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Fig. 1. Histograms of time on the market for rentals in Craigslist data and current duration for renters.
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contracted price.
Using our matched data, we construct a measure of how long each home is on the market, Ti, by using the time span in
days between its ﬁrst and last postings plus three days:
T lastdate firstdate 3i i i= − +
The three additional days are used so that homes only listed once are still “on the market” for some time period. Our results
are robust to changes in this length of time.10 The average number of days between postings for the same home in our rental
data is 6 days and 8 days in the for-sale market.
In this section, our notion of a submarket is all housing for rent or sale within a zip code with the same number of
bedrooms. Piazzesi et al. (2015), using data on for-sale search queries from the San Francisco Bay Area, similarly partition
their markets into submarkets based on zip codes and number of bathrooms.11 US zip codes are ﬁve digit post codes that
tend to be cardinally geographically clustered. For instance, all zip codes with 100 as the ﬁrst three digits (three digit zip) are
located in New York City. In this section then a “market” is a collection of submarkets with the same number of bedrooms
and the same ﬁrst three digits in their zip code. For measures of rent-to-price ratios, we create rental and sale price indices
for each zip code by number of bedroom cell by taking the mean rental or sale price for that cell and then taking the ratio of
the mean rent to mean price as the rent-to-price ratio for that cell.12 We keep only those cells for which we have at least 10
unique rental and 10 unique for-sale listings in our sample.
From the 2010 Census, we have zip code level measures of the number of occupied rentals and owner-occupied homes,
the numbers of vacant properties for-rent and for-sale (though these properties usually must be vacant for over six months
to be recorded as vacant), and the proportion of households with head of house age 35 or over. The 2000 Census contains
information about the prior moving dates of households (conditional on tenure). From the ACS, we have median income in
each zip code and homeownership rates by number of bedrooms for each zip code.
We use two different proxies for average expected duration, both conditional on tenure: the proportion of households in
the submarket with a head of the house 35 years old or over (proportion over 35), and the average time since last move for
renters (current duration).13 Age is positively correlated with expected duration (since uncertainty over income and family
prospects falls with age, see Halket and Vasudev, 2014), so the proportion over 35 in a submarket will be positively cor-
related with the average expected duration of households in the submarket. Meanwhile (ex post) actual duration is almost
certainly positively correlated with a household's (ex ante) expected duration. Fig. 1 shows the densities by cell of various
dimensions of the rental market.
We are interested in variation within a market at the submarket level. In the model that follows, households choose a
submarket from within a market to direct their search to. Our theory connects households' expected duration in a home10 In particular, one might worry that in markets with few Craigslist postings, landlords would need to re-post their advertisement less often and thus
that in these markets we should consider them “on the market” for longer than three days after their last posting. In one robustness exercise, we adjusted
the additional days we add so that they vary by market (but not submarket) so that markets with few postings on Craigslist per day have more additional
days; our results did not change. Furthermore, some rental listings may not be genuine vacancies but rather may just be a stock ad used by a real estate
agency ﬁshing for customers to call them. Others may be a stock ad used by a management company for a building with multiple vacancies in its building.
To account for these possibilities as best as possible, we censor our data by dropping any listing which we record as T 75i > . The results presented below are
robust to alternative censoring thresholds as well as alternative windows for matching listings. Using the 75 day threshold, 3% of our sample postings are
dropped.
11 They also partition based on price to attempt to capture residual quality.
12 In the Appendix, we do a robustness check using rent-to-price ratios from Zillow.com.
13 The 2000 Census gives the number of renters that have moved into their current home in the last year, between 1 and 5 years ago, etc. We use the
midpoint of each cell and take the average.
Table 1
Regressions of prices on vacancy durations and durations in home.
Rent Rent Rent Price Price Price
Time rent 0.025n
(0.010)
Time sale 0.078nn
(0.029)
Prop over 35 yr 0.195nn 0.475n
(0.024) (0.273)
Duration in home 0.036nn 0.124n
(0.014) (0.059)
Median inc 0.359nn 0.364nn 0.352nn 0.740nn 0.721nn 0.780nn
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043)
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.79 0.79 0.79
N 12,542 12,542 12,116 10,821 10,821 10,425
All variables are in logs and all regressions include dummies for each market. Time rent (time sale) is the Ti conditional on being for-rent (for-sale). Rent
(price) is the ﬁnal listed rent (price) for the property. Prop over 35 yr is the proportion of households in the zip code with head of house age 35 or over that
are renting (owning) for the rent (price) regressions. Likewise duration in home is the duration for renter (owner-occupiers) for the rent (price) regressions.
SEs, clustered by market, in parentheses.
N is the number of submarkets included in each regression.
n p 0.05< .
nn p 0.01< .
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123 111with the submarkets they choose to search and live in and with rental rates and the availability of rental homes. The
distribution of expected durations in a market is treated as exogenous, but submarket choice (and therefore the average
expected duration in a submarket), price and availability are all endogenous outcomes. Given that, the regression results
presented below should be thought of as evidence of correlations between market outcomes and not anything causal and
the standard errors taken with a grain of salt.
There are several other caveats worth mentioning. The Craigslist listings are not random selections from their various
markets, particularly in the for-sale markets. Furthermore, we cluster the standard errors at the market level and include
dummies for at the market and number of bedrooms level but do not otherwise account for spatially correlated errors. All of
our results are robust to clustering and including dummies at the county or city level instead.
Omitted variables are also likely an issue. We include median income in the zip in our regressions to try and capture
some of the differences in unobserved housing quality across submarkets. Of course, neither age nor perhaps realized
duration is orthogonal to income. Furthermore expected duration is correlated with tenure decisions due to the high
transaction costs of homeownership. So the homeownership rate results below should be taken with an additional grain of
salt.
Finally, our partitions of markets and submarkets are somewhat arbitrary: our theory has nothing to say about whether
or why contracts sort along geographic dimensions nor does it shed any light as to the geographic size of a submarket. In
reality, there may be several heterogeneous submarkets within each zip  bedroom cell and some submarkets may
potentially overlap across cells. Piazzesi et al. (2015) ﬁnd multiple for-sale submarkets within individual zip codes and that
households typically search in multiple zip codes. In this case the elasticities presented in the tables here would then likely
understate the true elasticities.
Table 1 shows that, in our data, both rental and sale prices are lowest in the submarkets where (respectively) rental and
sale time on markets are lowest; a relationship which will follow naturally from the free entry conditions in our model. For
instance, landlords must be compensated with higher rents when renting in submarkets where houses stay vacant for
longer. Fig. 2 (upper right) shows the same correlation between rent-to-price ratios and rental vacancy rates using only data
on 2 bedrooms houses in King County (Seattle–Tacoma–Bellevue, Washington MSA).14 Table 1 also shows that younger
households as well as households with shorter current durations searched in submarkets with higher rental prices but
lower sales prices. Rent-to-price ratios in the submarkets where these households search are therefore higher. Despite the
fact that rentals are expensive relative to prices, though, homeownership rates tend to be lower in these same submarkets
(Table 2 and, for Seattle, Fig. 2 – upper left). Verbrugge (2008), Verbrugge and Poole (2010) and Bracke (2013) ﬁnd similar
correlations between rent-to-price ratios and homeownership rates, the latter even after controlling for potential unob-
served heterogeneity.
From Table 2, households with lower expected durations search for rentals in submarkets where time on the market is
longer, while time on the for-sale submarket is hardly different. Guasch and Marshall (1985) ﬁnd a similar correlation
between rental vacancy hazards and rental vacancy durations in a cross-section of Philadelphia rental housing. As we will
now show, a negative correlation between expected duration and time on the market is not consistent with a competitive14 The Seattle MSA has the largest number of rental listings in our data. Each point represents a submarket with 2 bedrooms in King County. Rent-to-
price ratios are the mean rent in that submarket (e.g. the mean over 2 bedroom listings in zip code 98001) divided by the mean price in that submarket in
our Craigslist data.
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Fig. 2. King county. Rent-to-price ratios and time on the rental market are the ratio of the mean rent to mean price and mean number of days that a
property is posted for rent for two bedroom houses in a zip code in King County, Washington using the Craigslist data. Homeownership rates are from the
Census data at the same bedroom  zip code level.
Table 2
Regressions of vacancy duration and homeownership rates on durations in home.
Time rent Time rent Time sale Time sale Homeownership Homeownership
Prop over 35 yr 0.059nn 0.084 0.767nn
(0.018) (0.075) (0.087)
Duration in home 0.071nn 0.002 0.360nn
(0.013) (0.016) (0.045)
Median inc 0.015 0.029n 0.000 0.000 0.267nn 0.379nn
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.029) (0.021)
R2 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.82 0.82
N 12,542 12,116 10,822 10,426 13,080 12,655
See notes to Table 1. For the homeownership regressions, prop over 35 yr and duration in home are the submarket averages unconditional on tenure.
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123112search equilibrium with public information. Instead, the data show that landlords match quickly with long duration
households, which will be consistent with the presence of private information.3. Model
In this section we develop a model of competitive search with adverse selection as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). We build on
their work in several ways. Our model is dynamic which, among other things, endogenizes the stock of households
searching at any given time. It also allows us to endogenize the differences in the value of the asset to the different searchers
through differences in the expected duration of the match. This in turn means that different households can have the same
preference orderings over contracts conditional on matching but different preference orderings over contracts while still
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123 113searching. So both the contract terms and the associated equilibrium market tightnesses may be needed to screen
households.
3.1. Preferences and technology
Time is continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. There is a measure one of households indexed by their type
i I1, 2, ,∈ = { … } and a large set of landlords or, synonymously, builders. Let πi be the fraction of households of type i in the
population, for all i. If a landlord decides to participate in the market, she pays a cost H in units of utility to build a house but
then houses are costless to maintain; if she does not participate, she gets a payoff equal to 0. Households receive a ﬂow
utility of h when they occupy a house and 0 when they do not. Households and landlords each discount at the same rate
h H/ρ < .
Households that are currently occupying a house separate with it at a hazard rate  :γ Γ→ ⊂ +, at which point a
separated household no longer receives any utility from living in that particular house. Without loss of generality, we
assume that γ is strictly decreasing in type. We will often refer to a household of type i as having a hazard iiγ γ= ( ). We
denote 1γ γ¯ ≡ and limi I iγ γ≡ → so that ,Γ γ γ= [ ¯].
For simplicity, we will ﬁrst model an economy with only renting. The qualitative differences between the competitive
equilibrium with public versus private information will remain unchanged when later we add in owner-occupation.
3.2. The rental market
A rental contract w W∈ speciﬁes a ﬂow rent, possibly contingent on type, paid by the household to the landlord if
matched. The contract ends in the case of separation. For simplicity, we will restrict our attention to rental contracts with a
ﬁxed ﬂow rent. Barker (2003) and Guasch and Marshall (1987) ﬁnd that most rental contracts do not have a duration-of-stay
discount. In Section 5 we extend the setting to fully dynamic contracts with risk-averse households and show that our
results still follow even with endogenous duration-of-stay discounts.
We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, a household's type is publicly observable and so contracts are also free to have type-
speciﬁc rents. However, we will show that in equilibrium, only one type is lured by each contract. In the second case, a
household's type is private information. In this case, by the revelation principle, we assume that landlords post a contract
which contains direct revelation mechanisms for each type, without loss of generality. Following Guerrieri et al. (2010), we
will show that we can assume without loss of generality that landlords post contracts with type-independent mechanisms.
More precisely, in the private information case the equilibrium with contracts is payoff equivalent to the equilibrium with
degenerate mechanisms offering the same rent to each household, which enables us to simplify the notation greatly.15
Because in equilibrium each type of household directs its search to at most one type of rental contract (and later when we
add owning, at most one type of owning contract), we will call a submarket all houses with a renting and/or owning
contract that attracts a particular type of household. That is, we will have one submarket for each i.
The matching process between households and landlords is frictional. At any given time landlords post a single contract
at zero cost and households direct their search to the most attractive contracts.16
Associated with any contract w, let u be the measure of households directing their search to w and v be the measure of
landlords posting w. Deﬁne u v/θ = as the market tightness associated with contract w, : Wθ → +. Households ﬁnd a house
at rate hα θ( ) where  :hα →+ + and αh is decreasing in θ. Landlords ﬁll a vacancy at rate lα θ( ), where  :lα →+ + is
increasing in θ. We assume that l hα θ θα θ( ) = ( ), that is equivalent to constant returns to scale in matching, and
0h lα α( ) = (∞) = ∞ and 0 0h lα α(∞) = ( ) = . We assume that the elasticity of lα θ( ), d d/ /l lε θ θ α θ α θ θ( ) ≡ ( ( )) ( ) is constant: ε θ ε( ) = .
Let wiψ ( ) be the share of households of type i applying to any given contract w, so that
w w w w, , , I I1 2ψ ψ ψ ψ Δ( ) = { ( ) ( ) … ( )} ∈ , where IΔ is the I -dimensional unit simplex, : W Iψ Δ→ . The market tightness wθ ( ) and
the share of households applying to w, wψ ( ) are determined in equilibrium.
Let V r, ,r iγ θ( ) and Z r, ,r iγ θ( ) be the expected values of living in a house and searching for a house,17 respectively, to the
households of type i applying to any given contract, w with rental payment for that type of r. wθ θ= ( ) is the market
tightness associated with the contract w. Then
V r h r Z r V r, , , , , , 1r i i r i r iρ γ θ γ γ θ γ θ( ) = − + ( ( ) − ( )) ( )
Z r V r Z r, , , , , , 2r i
l
r i r iρ γ θ
α θ
θ
γ θ γ θ( ) = ( ) ( ( ) − ( )) ( )
Let Y r, ,r iγ θ( ) and X w,r θ( ) be the expected values of an occupied house when matched with a type i and a vacant house,
respectively, to the landlord:15 This esthetic feature is not true in the setting with fully-dynamic contracts in Section 5; which is the main reason why we deal with it separately (see
our discussion of Lemma 4).
16 Matching is bilateral, thus every household can only apply to one contract, but she can use mixed strategies.
17 These are the values of searching and living in the same market, repeatedly ad inﬁnitum.
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Y r r X w Y r
X w w Y r X w
, , , , ,
, , , ,
r i i r r i
r l
i
i r i i r∑
ρ γ θ γ θ γ θ
ρ θ α θ ψ γ θ θ
( ) = + ( ( ) − ( ))
( ) = ( ) ( )( ( ) − ( ))
∈
where wiψ ( ) is the share of households of type i applying to the contract w, specifying rent ri for that type, and θ is the
market tightness associated with that contract.
Solving for the ﬂow value of searching Z r, ,r iρ γ θ( ) and posting X wrρ ( ) gives
Z r h r, ,
3
r i
l
i l
ρ γ θ α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
( ) = ( )
( + ) + ( )
( − )
( )
 
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟X w
w w r
, 1
4
r l
i
i
i
l
i
i i
i
1
∑ ∑ρ θ α θ ψρ γ α θ
ψ
ρ γ
( ) = + ( ) ( )
+
( ) ( )
+ ( )∈
−
∈
Notice that Z r, , 0r iρ γ θ( ) < if r h> , i∀ and 0θ∀ > , thus no household would apply to a contract that imposes a ﬂow rent
r higher than the ﬂow utility from housing h. Similarly, X w H,r θ( ) < if r Hi ρ< for all i for which w 0iψ θ( ) > .
3.3. Equilibrium with public informationDeﬁnition 1. A steady-state competitive search equilibrium with renting and public information is a vector Zr
i
i{ }⁎ ∈ , a set of
contracts W Wr ⊆⁎ each of which speciﬁes a rent ri for each i ∈ , a function : Wrθ →⁎ +, a measure λ on W with support
Wr
⁎, and a function : W Iψ Δ→ satisfying, for each i ∈ :
(i) Landlords' proﬁt maximization and free entry:
 
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟w
w
w
w r
H1 l r
i
i
i
l r
i
i i
i
1
∑ ∑α θ ψρ γ α θ
ψ
ρ γ
ρ+ ( ( )) ( )
+
( ( )) ( )
+
≤⁎
∈
−
⁎
∈
with equality if w Wr∈ ⁎.
(ii) Households' optimal search:
Z
w
w w
h rLet max
1
r
i
w
l r
r i l r
i
Wr ρ
α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
≡ ( ( ′))
( ′)( + ) + ( ( ′))
( − ′)⁎
′∈
⁎
⁎ ⁎⁎
Then w W∀ ∈
Z
w
w w
h r
1
r
i l r
r i l r
iρ
α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
≥ ( ( ))
( )( + ) + ( ( ))
( − )⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
with equality if w 0rθ ( ) >⁎ and w 0iψ ( ) > .
(iii) Market clearing:

⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟w w
w
d w i,i r
l r
i
i
Wr
∫ ψ θ α θγ λ π( ) ( ) +
( ( )) ( ) = ∀ ∈⁎
⁎
⁎
The equilibrium deﬁnition imposes restrictions on the off-equilibrium beliefs of the landlords. The optimal search value
of any type-i household is deﬁned over the set of contracts posted in equilibrium Wr
⁎ only, but under any deviating contract
w Wr′ ∉ ⁎, landlords expect market tightness wrθ ( ′)⁎ to adjust to make all types of households weakly worse off.
We can distinguish competitive equilibria according to whether there are contracts which attract more than one type in
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. A separating competitive equilibrium is any competitive equilibriumwhere for all w Wr∈ ⁎ and for all i, w 0iψ ( ) >
implies w 1iψ ( ) = . A pooling equilibrium is any competitive equilibrium that is not separating. Two competitive equilibria
(indexed by A and B) are allocatively equivalent if for all i ∈ and w WA rA∈ ⁎ , w 0i Aψ ( ) > implies that there exists a w WB rB∈ ⁎
with w 0i Bψ ( ) > such that r riA iB= and w wr A A r B Bθ θ( ) = ( )⁎ ⁎ and vice versa.
Lemma 1. If there exists a pooling competitive equilibrium with public information, then there exists an allocatively equivalent
separating competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
So, rents and market tightnesses for each type do not vary across different competitive equilibria. In separating com-
petitive equilibria, the market endogenously segments into submarkets, one for any different type i of households. Thus
without loss of generality we can assume that a contract w in a separating competitive equilibrium contains a menu of rents
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contract w to households of type i, given by v w w w/i i l r i rγ π α θ γ θ( ) = ( ( ( )) + ( ))⁎ ⁎ .3.3.1. Characterization
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a separating competitive search equilibrium is the following18:
Proposition 1. For any type i of households, a posted contract wr
i⁎ and the associated market tightness wr
i
r r
iθ θ≡ ( )⁎ ⁎ ⁎ are part of
an equilibrium allocation if and only if they solve the following constrained maximization problem, Ri:
h w
w H
max
s.t.
w
l i
i i l i
i
l i
i l i
i
,i i
α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
α θ
ρ γ α θ
ρ
( )
( + ) + ( )
( − )
( )
+ + ( )
≥
θ
The equilibrium allocation maximizes the expected value of search of any type-i household conditional on the ﬁrms
making non-negative proﬁts.
Proposition 2. A solution to Ri exists for each i. The solution is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2. In the solution to R Ri i= { } ∈ , for all i j, ∈ with i j≠ , r i r jθ θ≠⁎ ⁎
Proof. Using the constraint with equality to substitute for wr
i⁎ , the ﬁrst order condition implies the following equilibrium
condition for the market tightness:
h
H
1
1
1 1 5r
i
i
l r
iρ θ
ε
ε
ρ γ
α θ ε
= +
−
+ +
( )( − ) ( )⁎ ⁎
The implicit solution for r
iθ⁎ is strictly increasing in γi.□
Lemma 3. Any competitive equilibrium with public information is a separating competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1.□
The equilibrium values of the ﬂow rent wr
i⁎ and the household's expected value Zr
iρ ⁎ are given by
w H
Z H
1
1
r
i i l r
i
l r
i
r
i
r
i
ρ γ α θ
α θ
ρ
ρ
θ
ε
ε
ρ
= + + ( )
( )
=
−
⁎
⁎
⁎
⁎
⁎
We have the following comparative static results as γi varies:
Result 1. In equilibrium, as the separation hazard γi increases:
(i) the market tightness r
iθ⁎ increases;
(ii) the ﬂow rent wr
i⁎ increases;
(iii) the expected value to households Zr
i⁎ decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, households with lower expected durations have lower surpluses from matching with a house and thus face tighter
markets and higher rents once matched and as a consequence have lower search values. Searching for a new tenant is costly,
so more surplus is created when a landlord is matched with a high expected duration tenant. In equilibrium, absent other
frictions, this extra surplus should be allocated towards some combination of lower rents and more houses, decreasing both
the cost of housing and search costs for households. That is, absent other frictions, long duration households should ﬁnd
housing faster and landlords should take longer to match with long duration households.18 See e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for a proof, with one caveat to the proof of sufﬁciency: in our setting, even if mechanisms in Wr
⁎ are separating,
other mechanisms in W can be pooling. It is straightforward to use the argument in the proof of Lemma 1 to show that if the sufﬁciency conditions are met
for a separating competitive search equilibrium with separating-only mechanisms then they will be met here too.
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The equilibrium allocation in the public information case implies that every type j I< strictly prefers to search in a
higher (i j> ) type's market if she was offered the higher type's contracted rent. In this subsection, we assume that the type
of the household, i, is known only by the household. So, the public information allocation will not be incentive compatible
under private information.
A mechanism in this setting would be a set of rents r i{ } ∈ . However, from the household's value of being matched (1), it is
clear that the only mechanism compatible with truth telling offers the same rent to any reported type.
Lemma 4. A contract is incentive compatible if and only if it offers the same rent to any reported type.
Proof. Follows from the household's value of being matched to a contract.□
So we can safely associate any incentive compatible contract w with its associated rent (and thus can assume
w H h,ρ∈ [ ]).19
Lemma 5. Sorting: i∀ , w H h,ρ∈ [ ], 0θ ≥ , and 0ϵ > , there exists a couple w B w w, ,θ θ( ′ ′) ∈ ( ( ))ϵ , with w w′ < and θ θ′ > , such
that
Z w Z w and
Z w Z w
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
r j r j j i
r j r j j i
γ θ γ θ γ γ
γ θ γ θ γ γ
( ′ ′) > ( ) ∀ ≤
( ′ ′) < ( ) ∀ >
Proof. Follows from Eq. (3).□
The sorting lemma is similar to a standard “single-crossing conditions.”20 Given θ, different types do not have different
preference orderings over w with private information. Sorting is only achieved through a local perturbation of both the rent
and market tightness. We can now deﬁne the equilibrium, following and extending the deﬁnition in Guerrieri et al. (2010) to
a dynamic setting.
Deﬁnition 3. A steady-state competitive search equilibrium with renting and private information is a vector Zp
i
i{ }⁎ ∈ , a set of
rents (i.e. incentive compatible contracts) H hW ,p ρ⊆ [ ]⁎ , a measure λ on H h,ρ[ ] with support Wp⁎ , a function H h: ,pθ ρ[ ] →⁎ +
and a function H h: , Iψ ρ Δ[ ] → satisfying:
(i) landlords' proﬁt maximization and free entry: for any w H h,ρ∈ [ ]

⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥w
w
w H1 l p
i
i
i
1 1
∑α θ ψρ γ ρ+ ( ( ))
( )
+
≤⁎
∈
− −
with equality if w Wp∈ ⁎ .
(ii) households' optimal search: Let
Z
w
w w
h wmax
1
p
i
w
l p
p i l pWp ρ
α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
≡
( ( ′))
( ′)( + ) + ( ( ′))
( − ′)⁎
′∈
⁎
⁎ ⁎⁎
Then w H h,ρ∀ ∈ [ ] and iγ∀
Z
w
w w
h w
1
p
i l p
p i l pρ
α θ
θ ρ γ α θ
≥
( ( ))
( )( + ) + ( ( ))
( − )⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
with equality if w 0pθ ( ) >⁎ and w 0iψ ( ) > .
(iii) market clearing:
w w
w
d w i,i p
l p
i
i
Wp
∫ ψ θ α θγ λ π( )( ( ) +
( ( ))
) ( ) = ∀⁎
⁎
⁎
As in the public information case, the equilibrium deﬁnition imposes conditions on the off-equilibrium beliefs of the
landlords. Heuristically, a landlord considering whether to post a deviating contract w′ imagines an initial market tightness
θ¼0. If no household is willing to apply, then θ¼0 and the deviation is not proﬁtable. Otherwise, some households apply,19 Lemma 4 relies on our restriction of the rental contract space to constant rent proﬁles. When we relax this assumption, as Section 5, the lemma no
longer holds. However Lemma 4 is not necessary for a separating equilibrium and it is straightforward to see that such an equilibrium exists in Section 5's
relaxed setting. We also show there that this setting can generate “length of stay” discounts in rents (e.g. a downward sloping rent proﬁle with respect to
actual duration).
20 It is slightly different. See Guerrieri et al. (2010) for an elaboration.
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123 117increasing market tightness θ, until only one type of household i is indifferent about the deviating w′ and all others j
(weakly) prefer their equilibrium contracts. This in turn pins down the share ψi of households applying to that contract.
3.4.1. Equilibrium and characterization
The characterization of the equilibriumwith private information is equivalent to the public information equilibriumwith
an extra incentive compatibility constraint that imposes that no other types of households j are attracted to the contract wi.
In the next proposition, we show that at the optimum, for all i 1> , only the marginal incentive compatibility constraints
IC i i1,( − ) bind: every type i 1( − ) is indifferent between his own contract and the contract offered to the type i with
marginally higher expected duration.
Proposition 3. Let the problem PR( ) be deﬁned by the following constrained maximization problem PRi( ), for any i ∈ :
 
Z w
w H
Z w Z w j i IC j i
max , ,
s.t.
and , , , , for all ,
w
r i
l
i l
r j r j p
j
p
j
,
γ θ
α θ
ρ γ α θ
ρ
γ θ γ θ
( )
( )
+ + ( )
≥
( ) ≤ ( ) ≠ [ ( )]
θ∈ ∈
⁎ ⁎
+ +
where w ,p
i
p
iθ⁎ ⁎ is an optimal solution for i.
The solution of PR( ) exists and is unique. Moreover, only the marginal incentive compatibility constraints IC i i1,( − ) bind, for all
i 1> :
Z w Z w
Z w Z w j i i
, , , , and
, , , , , 1
r i p
i
p
i
r i p
i
p
i
r j p
i
p
i
r j p
j
p
j
1 1
, 1 , 1γ θ γ θ
γ θ γ θ
( ) = ( )
( ) < ( ) ∀ ≠ −
−
⁎ ⁎
−
⁎ − ⁎ −
⁎ ⁎ ⁎ ⁎
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, for the type with the highest separation hazard, 1γ γ= ¯, the equilibrium allocation is the same as the one with public
information. Then, the problem is solved iteratively for all other types:
(i) For i¼1, wp1⁎ and p1θ⁎ solve R1
(ii) For each i 1> , wpi⁎ and piθ⁎ are the solutions to
 
Z w
w H
Z w Z w
max , ,
s.t.
and , , , ,
w
r i
l
i l
r i p
i
p
i
r i p
i
p
i
,
1 1
, 1 , 1
γ θ
α θ
ρ γ α θ
ρ
γ θ γ θ
( )
( )
+ + ( )
≥
( ) ≤ ( )
θ∈ ∈
−
⁎ ⁎
−
⁎ − ⁎ −
+ +
We are now ready to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium allocation:
Proposition 4. There exists a unique separating equilibrium. A set of contracts w w H h, ,p
i
p
i ρ{ } ∈ [ ]⁎ ⁎ and market tightnesses
 w,p
i
p
i
p p
i
iθ θ θ θ{ } ≡ ( ) ≡⁎ ⁎ ⁎ ⁎ associated with their respective types γi are part of the equilibrium allocation if and only if they
solve the problem PR.
Proof. See Appendix.
We have the following comparative static results as γi varies.
Result 2. In equilibrium, as the separation hazard γi increases:
(i) the market tightness p
iθ⁎ decreases;
(ii) the ﬂow rent wp
i⁎ increases;
(iii) the expected value to households Zp
i⁎ decreases;
(iv) the vacancy rate, v u v/p
i
i p
i
p
iπ( − − )⁎ ⁎ ⁎ increases;
Proof. See Appendix.
Result 2 is similar to result 1 except that, contrary to the public information case, low-γ types search in tighter rather
than looser rental submarkets in equilibrium. These types pay even lower rents if matched. In this way landlords are able to
optimally (with the least cost) separate types of households by posting contracts wp
i⁎ lower than the ﬁrst-best optimum wr
i⁎
to those that expect to stay longer, in return for a higher market tightness p
iθ⁎ .
The intuition for the result is that households that expect to stay longer are less affected by a higher market tightness
(and thus longer expected search times) because they expect to separate from the house and “pay” the search cost less
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matched a higher fraction of time for any given market tightness θ. The combination of these two factors implies that the
second best allocation dictates tighter markets for those that expect to stay longer, contrary to the ﬁrst best allocation. These
tighter markets imply a lower vacancy rate (deﬁned as vacancies per unit of housing).3.5. Owning market
An owning contract simply speciﬁes an up-front payment P paid by the household to the seller, which may vary across
submarkets. Households derive the same ﬂow utility h if they own or rent the house, and landlords (i.e. builders) pay the
same building cost H.
As will become clear below, absent some further friction, owning would efﬁciently solve the private information problem
and all houses would be owner-occupied.21 To provide heterogeneity, we assume that there is an extra friction for owner-
occupies which is heterogeneous in the population.22 We assume that each household draws a “friction” ,χ χ χ∈ [ ] ⊂ +
from a probability distribution F, which is a ﬁxed effect for the household. For simplicity, we assume that χ is independent of
type i and that the friction additively taxes the value of searching and living in a house. Independence could be easily
relaxed while additivity means that, for each type i, there will be at most one owning contract that in equilibrium attracts
searchers, which eases notation.23
Builders only have to sell a new house. It is important to notice that sellers posting an owning contract are not concerned
about the buyer's type, regardless of whether this information is private or public. A household that buys the house, an
owner, fully internalizes the expected search cost eventually paid in the case of separation, contrary to a renter. The builder's
expected value of posting an owning contract for sale at price P with implied tightness θ is simply given by
X P P,
6
o
l
l
θ α θ
ρ α θ
( ) = ( )
+ ( ) ( )
Notice that (6) is independent of γi. In equilibrium X P H,o θ( ) = for any owning submarket with positive ownership rates.
This will immediately imply that sale prices are negatively correlated with market tightnesses across submarkets.
The values of searching as a buyer and living in a submarket with owner-occupied market tightness θ and price P for a
household of type i and cost χ, respectively, are given by
Z P V P Z P P
V P h X P Z P V P
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
o i h o i o i
o i i o i o i
ρ γ θ χ α θ γ θ χ γ θ χ χ
ρ γ θ χ γ θ γ θ χ γ θ χ χ
( ) = ( )( ( ) − ( ) − ) −
( ) = + ( ( ) + ( ) − ( )) −
Solving for the ﬂow value of searching as a buyer gives
Z P Z r, , , , ,o i r i iρ γ θ χ ρ γ θ χ( ) = ( ) −
where r P /i i l lρ γ α θ ρ α θ= ( + + ( )) ( + ( )).3.6. Equilibrium with both renting and owning
In the appendix, we formally deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with private information and both renting and owning.
The market endogenously segments into submarkets and we can characterize the equilibrium allocation using an equivalent
constrained maximization problem. The equilibrium with both renting and owning can be characterized by the iterative
solutions to a problem analogous to the one with only renting24:21 The i¼1 type would be indifferent between owning and renting.
22 There are plenty of potential candidate frictions. For instance, a (possibly heterogeneous) “ﬁnancing cost” or additional transactions costs. See Halket
and Pignatti (2012) for an example where the friction is sequential search for owner-occupiers.
23 Fixed types and χs are not essential. For instance, we could allow a household's type i and χ to change whenever it received a separation shock. The
economy would be quantitatively exactly the same as long as the distribution over types and χ remained constant.
24 We omit the proof, however it too is similar to the case with only renting.
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Result 3. The proportion of type i that are homeowners is increasing in i and thus expected duration.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the equilibrium is separating, submarkets contain only one type. Result 3 says that submarkets with high duration
types will have higher ownership rates on average. The equilibrium in the private information rental market for the highest-
γ type is the same as in the public information case. For households with lower γ's, the equilibrium in the (private infor-
mation) rental market is increasingly distorted with respect to the ﬁrst best (public information) equilibrium. This imme-
diately implies that the type-speciﬁc cutoff χ† such that Z Zpi o i χ˜ = ( )⁎ † is increasing in i. The optimal market tightness con-
ditional on owning for each type, o
iθ⁎ , is identical to the optimal tightness in that type's rental market with public infor-
mation, r
iθ⁎ .
Homeownership rates increase in expected duration solely because the rental frictions modeled here are endogenously
increasing in expected duration. If we relaxed the assumption that the distribution of χ was independent of i, it would be
natural to assume that those with higher expected durations also had lower homeownership frictions. For instance, an
exogenous transaction costs to buying a house would work in such a manner. In such cases, this would reinforce Result 3.4. Calibration
As we know from the theoretical results above, for any parametrization, the model with private information gives the
following qualitative patterns: (a) rentals have a lower time on the market in submarkets with lower rents, (b) households
with high expected durations that search for rentals search for ones with low times on the market and lower rents; (c)
households with high expected durations search in for-sale markets with higher prices if they search for owner-occupied
housing; and (d) areas with high ownership rates also have low rent-to-price ratios. These are qualitatively consistent with
our ﬁndings from the data. In this section, we match the model quantitatively to the data and measure the welfare loss due
to private information.
A key parameter governing the size of the welfare loss due to the private information problem is the elasticity of the
matching function, ε. In the equilibrium with private information, the matching probability, αh, of long duration types
declines so as to screen those with shorter expected durations. Long duration types receive even lower rents (relative to the
public information benchmark) though. What determines the size of the welfare loss is how big a decrease in rents the
longer duration type households receive in exchange for a given change in their matching probability. A low elasticity means
that αl changes relatively little in response to a change in αh and therefore (using the landlords zero-proﬁt condition) rents
change relatively little as well. In this section, we calibrate the model to match the estimated elasticity of vacancy duration
with respect to expected occupancy duration from Section 2 as well as other moments. We ﬁnd that the data implies a very
low value of ε.
We set the interest rate, ρ¼0.03, in line with estimates of the ex ante real interest rate on the 10-year U.S. Treasury
Bonds, as in Campbell et al. (2009). Given ρ, only the ratio h H/ matters for relative rents, prices and market tightnesses. The
median duration of stay for renters in the U.S. is about 2 years (Hansen, 1998; Deng et al., 2003). We set 1γ = so that the
worst type of household expects to stay 1 year.25,26
We assume the matching function is Cobb–Douglas: m u v ku v, 1( ) = ε ε− . The disutility to owning, χ, only affects home-
ownership rates and has no effect on vacancy rates or prices in owning or renting markets. Furthermore, our model is about
rental frictions and has little to say about the frictions on the owner-occupied side of the market. For simplicity then we
assume it is distributed uniformly on Z0, . 15 r
1[ ]⁎ .
We calibrate the three remaining parameters, k, ε and h H/ , to match three moments in the data: the rent-to-price ratio, the
average duration of rental vacancies and the elasticity of rental vacancy duration with respect to expected duration. Gabriel and25 Hansen (1998) ﬁnds that over 75% of current renters have lived in their current residence for at least a year. We could of course include atypical
“renters” as well, such as short-term business travelers. Hotels and “executive rentals” do ﬁt our qualitative theory after all; they rent out at high nightly
rates but are relatively easy for tenants to secure. However they are not in our Craigslist data so we do not include them here.
26 We assume i i 1γ{ } ==∞ is dense in Γ.
Table 3
Moments in data and model.
Moment Data Model (Private) Model (Public)
r/p 3.5% 3.25% 3.3%
Avg(θ) 1.5 months 1.45 months 6 days
ln
1/
θ
γ
∂
∂( )
0.07 0.09 0>
r/p, Avg(θ) and ln / 1/θ γ∂ ∂( ) are the rent-to-price ratio, the average vacancy duration and the elasticity of vacancies with respect to expected duration,
respectively. See text for complete details.
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Fig. 3. Market tightness, prices and values.
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123120Nothaft (2001) report average vacancy durations of between 1.5 and 2 months in the U.S. Our estimate of the elasticity from
Section 2 is about 0.07 depending on which proxy for expected duration is used. We match these to the model using the
expected rental vacancy duration and its elasticity for the submarket that corresponds to the median renter, γ¼0.5. Campbell
et al. (2009) ﬁnd an average (annual) rent-to-price ratio of about 5% in their U.S. sample.27 However, rent-to-price ratios in the
data implicitly account also for maintenance, which we abstract from. Halket and Vasudev (2014) report maintenance of about
1.5%, so we target a model rent-to-price ratio of 3.5%. The rent-to-price ratio varies across submarkets, so again we target the
ratio at γ¼0.5. As it turns out, given the low estimate of ε, the rent-to-price ratio is between 3% and 4% for all submarkets. We
compute the model moments at each point k h H, , / 1, 2, , 20 0.05, 0.1, , 1 0.04, 0.05, , 0.15ε( ) ∈ [ … ] × [ … ] × [ … ] and choose the
point that minimizes the sum over the three moments of squared difference between the model and the data.2827 Rent-to-prices of course can vary considerably over time as interest rates, risk-premia, expected capital gains or other factors change.
28 The optimal point in the grid does not vary with alternative weights on the moments.
J. Halket, M. Pignatti Morano di Custoza / Journal of Monetary Economics 76 (2015) 107–123 121We ﬁnd that k¼8, ε¼0.1 and h H/ 0.05= . At these parameter values, the average rental vacancy duration in the γ¼0.5
submarket is 1.45 months, the elasticity is 0.09 and the rent-to-price ratio is 3.25%. Table 3 reports the moments from the
matched moments in the data and the model with private information, as well as the moment values under a public
information counterfactual. The left panel of Fig. 3 plots the market tightness, or queue length, and the homeownership rate
and the center panel plots the ﬂow rent (or ﬂow equivalent housing price) as a function of γ in the three economies: renting
with public information, renting with private information and owning.
The queue length increases as γ increases very slightly in the case of renting with public information and in the owning
economy, while it decreases as γ increases in the renting economy with private information. As we have already proven,
renting with public information cannot qualitatively match the negative estimated elasticity of vacancy durations with
respect to expected duration found in Table 2. Interestingly, with the very low calibrated value of ε, the elasticity of vacancy
durations in the owning market is positive but nearly zero, which is also what we ﬁnd in the data.
In both renting economies, the ﬂow rent increases with γ: it increases faster in the private information case to offset the
positive effect of the longer queue length faced by low γ-types on landlords' proﬁts. The housing price in the owning
economy markets, expressed in ﬂow terms ( Pρ ), decreases slightly as γ increases; prices are lower in markets where houses
sell quickly, as follows from the free entry condition for the owning market.
Finally, the right panel of Fig. 3 shows the expected value of searching for a house as a function of γ when renting with
public information and renting with private information. The expected value of renting is always higher with public
information rather than private (they coincide for the highest value of γ). The expected value increases as γ decreases in both
markets but it increases less in the private information renting market. Quantitatively, with the low elasticity, the expected
welfare loss of renting due private information is about 10% for all households with expected durations longer than 2 years.
Those households with low enough χ are able to ameliorate this loss by owning though. In the next section, we discuss how
duration dependent rental payments can also help ameliorate this welfare loss.5. Fully optimal rental contracts under private information
The welfare loss due to private information could be more efﬁciently ameliorated if rental contracts themselves could be
written in such a way as to affect the off-equilibrium value of searching for the low duration types without affecting the
equilibrium value of searching for higher types. That is, a planner could raise welfare by only lowering the off-equilibrium
value of low duration households deviating into higher duration households' markets. In turns out, this is exactly what
happens in a competitive equilibrium when we allow fully optimal, duration dependent contracts. In these contracts yield
the same allocation and welfare as the competitive equilibrium with public information if households are risk-neutral. If
households are risk averse then duration dependency does not generally obviate the private information problem.
We make two changes to the model: (a) limited commitment: households and landlords cannot make transfers to each
other once a separation shock is received (though this is implicit in the preceding sections above) and (b) households are
risk averse over their rent payments. Formally we assume that households still receive ﬂow utility h from being well-
matched to their current house. But now we assume that they receive disutility u rt( ) from paying a ﬂow rent rt at time t,
where u(0)¼0, u 0′ > , u 0″ > .
Incentive compatible equilibrium rental contracts will now be functions w(t) which depend on the duration of the match,
t, and, implicitly, on not receiving a separation shock. Equilibrium contracts will still be separating and the equilibrium can
still be characterized in a way similar to the private rental economy above (that is, a version of Proposition 4 holds here). So
we skip straight to the characterization and focus on the case with renting only.
We can write the value of search for a household:
Z w E U, ,
7
r i i
h i
h i
2 γ θ γ
α θ ρ γ
ρ α θ ρ γ
( ) = [ | ] ( )( + )
( ( ) + + ) ( )
where
E U e h u w t dt. 8i
t
i
0
i∫γ γ[ | ] = ( − ( ( ))) ( )ρ γ
∞
−( + )
Similarly we can write the value of search for the landlord:
X w E R, ,
9
r i i
l i
l i
2 γ θ γ
α θ ρ γ
ρ α θ ρ γ
( ) = [ | ] ( )( + )
( ( ) + + ) ( )
where
E R e w t dt. 10i
t
i
0
i∫γ γ[ | ] = ( ) ( )ρ γ
∞
−( + )
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γ θ γ θ
( )
( ) ≥
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θ ( )
⁎ ⁎
where w ,p
j
p
jθ⁎ ⁎ is an optimal solution for j.
To see how this equilibrium is characterized, we can examine how the optimal solution for w depends on t, conditional
on some θ (using that the incentive compatibility constraint binds for the next worse type):
e h u w t dt
e w t dt H
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to w(t) is
e
du
dw t
1
11
j
i
t
2 1j iλ
γ
γ
λ( − )
( )
=
( )
γ γ−( − )
where 1λ and 2λ are the Lagrange multipliers for the zero proﬁt and incentive compatibility conditions, respectively. Note if
information is public then 02λ = and du dw t/ 1λ( ) = , which means the optimal contract is constant with respect to time and
we have the same allocations as the public information rental economy in the body of the paper.
From (11), it is clear that w(t) is everywhere continuous in t. Differentiating (11) with respect to t gives (when 02λ > )
du
dw t
d u
dw t
dw t
dt 12j i
2
2
γ γ( − )
( )
=
( )
( )
( )
This yields dw dt/ 0< for all t.
So the optimal rental contract with private information is continuously declining with time. Tenants bear some risk by
paying more of the expected value of the contract sooner. Bearing this risk helps screen short durations types as they
(effectively) discount the future more. However high early payments imply a lower expected value of search than the public
information case. Thus there are competing tools to screen low duration searchers: high early payments and higher market
tightnesses. The welfare loss due to high early payments is increasing in risk aversion. So, for sufﬁciently high risk aversion,
the “planner” will still optimally distort market tightnesses by tightening them for long duration types as well as use
downward-tilting rent proﬁles.
6. Conclusion
Novel data on rental markets from Craigslist shows that submarkets with high duration households have lower rent-to-
price ratios, higher ownership rates and tighter rental markets. To explain these patterns, we build a competitive search
equilibrium model of housing tenure choices where households have private information over their expected duration.
Owning a house solves the private information problem but at some heterogeneous cost. We show that both renting and
owning markets endogenously segment into submarkets, one for every type of households.
In rental submarkets, households that expect to stay longer search in thinner markets in order to discourage more
footloose households from searching in the same submarket. Relative to the ﬁrst-best, the distortions in the rental market
with private information increase with expected duration. As a result, more of the households that expect to stay longest in
their houses will choose to own.
Scopes for extension include adding heterogeneity to the housing stock and using a life-cycle model to unify expected
durations and the costs of owning using perhaps a borrowing constraint. As long as any mooted cost of owning does not
increase too quickly with expected duration, those with the highest expected durations will choose to own.Acknowledgments
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